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Background: Nosocomial outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2
(SARS-CoV-2) are frequent despite implementation of conventional infection control
measures. An outbreak investigation was undertaken using advanced genomic and stat-
istical techniques to reconstruct likely transmission chains and assess the role of health-
care workers (HCWs) in SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
Methods: A nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in a university-affiliated rehabilitation clinic
was investigated, involving patients and HCWs, with high coverage of pathogen whole-
genome sequences (WGS). The time-varying reproduction number from epidemiological
data (Rt) was estimated, and maximum likelihood phylogeny was used to assess genetic
diversity of the pathogen. Genomic and epidemiological data were combined into a
Bayesian framework to model the directionality of transmission, and a caseecontrol study
was performed to investigate risk factors for nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 acquisition in
patients.ontrol Programme, Geneva University Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, Rue Gabrielle-Perret-Gentil
2 8828.
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M. Abbas et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 117 (2021) 124e134 125Findings: The outbreak lasted from 14th March to 12th April 2020, and involved 37 patients
(31 with WGS) and 39 employees (31 with WGS), 37 of whom were HCWs. Peak Rt was
estimated to be between 2.2 and 3.6. The phylogenetic tree showed very limited genetic
diversity, with 60 of 62 (96.7%) isolates forming one large cluster of identical genomes.
Despite the resulting uncertainty in reconstructed transmission events, the analyses sug-
gest that HCWs (one of whom was the index case) played an essential role in cross-
transmission, with a significantly greater fraction of infections (P<2.2e-16) attributable
to HCWs (70.7%) than expected given the number of HCW cases (46.7%). The excess of
transmission from HCWs was higher when considering infection of patients [79.0%; 95%
confidence interval (CI) 78.5e79.5%] and frail patients (Clinical Frailty Scale score >5;
82.3%; 95% CI 81.8e83.4%). Furthermore, frail patients were found to be at greater risk for
nosocomial COVID-19 than other patients (adjusted odds ratio 6.94, 95% CI 2.13e22.57).
Interpretation: This outbreak report highlights the essential role of HCWs in SARS-CoV-2
transmission dynamics in healthcare settings. Limited genetic diversity in pathogen
genomes hampered the reconstruction of individual transmission events, resulting in
substantial uncertainty in who infected whom. However, this study shows that despite
such uncertainty, significant transmission patterns can be observed.
ª 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd
on behalf of The Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Nosocomial outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) are frequent, and place an even
greater burden on healthcare systems coping with the coro-
navirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic [1]. Long-term care
facilities (LTCFs) and nursing homes have borne the brunt of
these nosocomial outbreaks, with a devastating impact on
morbidity and mortality [2e4].
These nosocomial outbreaks represent a challenge for infec-
tion prevention and control (IPC) professionals as they have been
widespread despite implementation of traditional preventive
measures. Among the hypotheses for the origins of these out-
breaks are the challenges of asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 [3,5], and the role of healthcare
workers (HCWs)as vectors andvictimsof theseoutbreaks, as they
are at the interface between healthcare settings and the com-
munity, and are not subject to strict lockdown measures [6].
Although several reports have used whole-genome sequencing
(WGS) and epidemiological data to describe outbreaks, very few
have also included data and sequences from HCWs [7e12].
The aim of this study was to reconstruct a nosocomial out-
break in a rehabilitation clinic during the first wave of the
COVID-19 pandemic, combining epidemiological and genetic
data, in order to better understand transmission dynamics.
Specific objectives were to establish viral transmission path-
ways, reconstruct a transmission tree, identify the major
modes of directionality of transmission, assess the impact of
infection prevention and control (IPC) measures on controlling
the outbreak, and evaluate risk factors for nosocomial
acquisition of SARS-CoV-2.
Methods
A retrospective description and analysis of a SARS-CoV-2
outbreak involving patients and HCWs in one of the rehabil-
itation clinics of Geneva University Hospitals (HUG) was per-
formed. The report was written in accordance with the ORION
guidelines [13].Setting
HUG is a tertiary care hospital consortium in Western Swit-
zerland. As part of HUG, there is a five-ward LTCF with 88 beds
catering for patients requiring palliative or rehabilitation care,
or for patients awaiting placement in a nursing home. The
rehabilitation clinic also has a restaurant, which serves meals
to patients, HCWs and external visitors. This clinic is monitored
directly by the IPC Programme staff, with weekly in-person
visits by members of staff and daily discussion of IPC meas-
ures by telephone.Definition of cases
Nosocomial COVID-19 was defined as patients with a positive
reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) for
SARS-CoV-2 with onset of symptoms compatible with SARS-CoV-
2 infection 5 days after admission to the clinic, in accordance
with Swissnoso guidelines [14]. HCWs were included in the
outbreak study if they were employed in the rehabilitation
clinic during the study period, and presented a positive RT-PCR
for SARS-CoV-2.Data sources
Data collected as part of prospective surveillance of all
patients hospitalized with COVID-19 mandated by the Swiss
Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) were used in this study
[15]. During the first wave of COVID-19, the HUG Department of
Occupational Health collected data prospectively from HCWs
with a positive RT-PCR for SARS-CoV-2, including date of
symptom onset and potential contacts. In addition, HUG
offered free RT-PCR testing for HCWs in a designated testing
site, and collected data on all individuals who presented for
SARS-CoV-2 testing as part of a prospective cohort study. Data
were extracted from the HUG Department of Human Resources
on HCW shifts. Patient trajectories were extracted from the
electronic health records.
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spectively from the electronic health records for the control
group, using the same RedCAPTM eCRF as for the FOPH cohort
study. Additional data collection instruments were created in
order to capture relevant risk factors based on an informal
literature search for both cases and controls. Among the vari-
ables collected were the Clinical Frailty Scale (CFS) score [16],
hypoalbuminaemia (and hypoprealbuminaemia) as a proxy for
malnutrition [17], current smoking, age, body mass index,
comorbidities, the Charlson Comorbidity Index [18], and the
Cumulative Illness Rating Scale e Geriatric (CIRS-G) [19]. The
CIRS-G was dichotomized as a binary variable with a cut-off at
15 points [20].
Descriptive epidemiology
An epidemic curve was produced using dates of symptom
onset; where these were unavailable (e.g. lack of symptoms),
they were imputed with the median difference between date
of symptom onset and date of nasopharyngeal swab.
Microbiological methods
All COVID-19 cases in the outbreak were confirmed by RT-
PCR on nasopharyngeal swabs. Three diagnostic methods
were used for routine screening: the Cobas 6800 SARS CoV2 RT-
PCR (Roche, Basel, Switzerland), the BD SARS-CoV2 reagent kit
for BD Max system (Becton, Dickinson and Co, Franklin Lakes,
NJ, USA), and an in-house method based on the Charité assay
[21]. SARS-CoV-2 WGS was performed using either an unbiased
high-throughput sequencing method or an amplicon-based
sequencing method in order to produce RNA sequences. Full
details of the microbiological methods, including the WGS and
the sequence assembly, can be found in the online
supplementary material.
Phylogenetic analysis
Sequence alignment was performed using MUSCLE v3.8.31.
The evolutionary analyses were conducted in MEGA X [22] using
the maximum likelihood method and Tamura 3-parameter
model [23]. All SARS-CoV-2 complete genomes sequenced by
the Laboratory of Virology (HUG) in the context of epidemio-
logical surveillance and submitted to Global Initiative on
Sharing Avian Influenza Database (GISAID) from respiratory
samples from patients with COVID-19 were integrated to the
phylogenetic analysis in addition to the case samples of this
outbreak analysis. The samples represent tests from various
medical centres in Geneva, Switzerland during the same
period.
Statistical analysis
Descriptive statistics were performed with medians and
interquartile ranges (IQR), and counts and proportions, as
appropriate. A caseecontrol study was performed to identify
risk factors for nosocomial COVID-19 among patients. The
control population was defined as patients who were hospi-
talized for 5 days (to avoid immortal bias) in the rehabil-
itation clinic during the outbreak period, and who had neither a
positive RT-PCR for SARS-CoV-2 nor a clinical diagnosis of
COVID-19 (presumed or confirmed). Unmatched controls wereselected at random from this population at a ratio of 2:1.
Associations between patient characteristics and nosocomial
COVID-19 were assessed using the Chi-squared test for cate-
gorical variables, and the KruskalleWallis test for continuous
variables. Univariable logistic regression was performed to
produce crude odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals
(95% CI). A multi-variable logistic regression model was built
using a forward fitting method, and the most parsimonious
model was selected as guided by the Akaike Information Cri-
terion and likelihood ratio tests [24]. Goodness-of-fit was
evaluated using the HosmereLemeshow test.
The time-varying reproduction number (Rt) was estimated
from the incidence of symptoms, using the incidence and Epi-
Estim packages for the R statistical software [25]. Rt estimation
was performed under a ‘short’ serial interval (time between
onset of symptoms in an infector/infectee pair) assumption,
consistent with early isolation of cases in the hospital context.
A ‘long’ serial interval assumption was considered in sensitivity
analyses (see online supplementary material).
Reconstruction of transmission trees
Epidemiological and genetic data were combined to recon-
struct who infected whom using the R package outbreaker2,
which has been used successfully to reconstruct 2003 SARS-
CoV-1 transmission trees [26,27]. The model uses a Bayesian
framework, which combines information on the generation
time (time between infections in an infector/infectee pair)
with a model of sequence evolution to probabilistically
reconstruct the transmission tree (see online supplementary
material for details on the analyses performed).
The method reflects the uncertainty in individual trans-
mission events by producing a large number of trees (posterior
trees) compatible with the data. To assess the role of HCWs in
transmission, fHCW, the proportion of infections attributed to
HCWs for each of the 999 posterior trees retained, was derived.
We tested if the average value of fHCW was greater than
expected given the proportion of HCWs amongst cases using a
WilcoxoneManneWhitney test. This analysis was done for all
cases, and also stratified by type of case infected: other HCWs,
patients, and frail patients (CFS score >5). A sensitivity anal-
ysis was conducted by replicating these analyses on runs of
outbreaker2, including one where contact data were not
used in the transmission tree reconstruction.
Statistical analyses were performed using R software version
4.0.3 (https://www.R-project.org/) and Stata Version 14
(StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA).
Ethical considerations
Outbreak investigations are within the purview of the IPC
programme. For additional investigations, the local ethics
committee approved this study (Ref. No. 2020-01330).
Results
The index case of the outbreak was a HCW who was detec-
ted on 14th March 2020; the first patient was detected 5 days
later on the same ward, and the last case was detected on 17th
April 2020. Therefore, the outbreak period was defined as
lasting from 1st March 2020 to 19th April 2020. In total, 37
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istrative staff) were involved in the outbreak. The institution-
level attack rate for patients was 21.2%. The epidemic curve
is shown in Figure 1A. All five wards of the clinic were involved
in the outbreak. Characteristics of patients and employees are
summarized in Table I and Table II, respectively.
Several infection control measures were implemented
sequentially (Figure 1C). Staff with a positive SARS-CoV-2 RT-
PCR were immediately placed on mandatory sick leave for a
minimal duration of 10 days from the onset of symptoms. Two
ward-level point-prevalence screening surveys of all negative
patients (including asymptomatic) were performed in affected
wards, and all staff were strongly encouraged to undergo
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Figure 1. (A) Epidemic curve of the nosocomial outbreak of corona
healthcare workers (HCWs) and patients. (B) Estimated time-varying r
Timeline of infection prevention and control interventions implement
the rehabilitation clinic. I, group activities with patients suspended; II,
IV, visitors banned; V, physical distancing in cafeterias; a, meals in roo
c, single bed rooms only (second floor); d, ward closure on second floo
infection prevention and control (IPC) nurse; g, pre-emptive contact
COVID-19; h, reminder of IPC measures; i, universal masking outside
coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) screening of all patients on second floor; k
ward closure on first floor; m, systematic SARS-CoV-2 screening of all
equipment; CrI, credible interval.2nd April 2020. Throughout the outbreak period, RT-PCR results
were obtained with an average turnaround time of approx-
imately 8 h.
Estimated time-varying reproduction number
It was estimated that Rt declined rapidly from 2.17 [95%
credible interval (CrI) 1.43e3.07] by 21st March 2020, with
mean Rt reaching <1 on 28
th March 2020 (Figure 1B). Trends
were similar when assuming a longer serial interval, albeit with
higher mean Rt estimates, at 3.60 (95% CrI 2.37e5.08) initially
and <1 by 28th March 2020 (Supplementary Figure 1, see online
supplementary material). Confining patients to their room
decreased Rt, but not below 1; although this was achieved byt of symptoms
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virus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in a rehabilitation clinic involving
eproduction number (Rt) across the duration of the outbreak. (C)
ed hospital-wide (Geneva University Hospitals), and specifically in
cafeterias only open to employees; III, universal masking (HCWs);
ms for patients; b, room confinement for patients on second floor;
r; e, ward attribution to physical therapists; f, daily meetings with
and droplet precautions in wards with at least one patient with
room (patients); j, systematic severe acute respiratory syndrome
, systematic SARS-CoV-2 screening of all patients on first floor; l,








Age, years 87 (77e89) 80 (74e86) 0.03
Gender (female) 27 (73.0) 47 (63.4) 0.32
Obesity 4 (10.8) 15 (20.3) 0.21
Active smoking 1 (2.7) 12 (16.2) 0.04
Albumin (g/L) 35 (32e38)a 36 (33e38)b 0.36
Pre-albumin (mg/L) 163 (130e214)a 173 (141e212)c 0.51
Clinical Frailty Scale score >5 33 (89.2) 40 (54.1) <0.001
Cumulative Illness Rating Scale e Geriatric 14 (12e18) 15 (11e19) 0.98
Cumulative Illness Rating Scale eGeriatric 15 18 (48.7) 38 (51.4) 0.79
Charlson Comorbidity Index 7 (4e9) 6 (4e8) 0.30
Charlson Comorbidity Index >7 17 (46.0) 19 (25.7) 0.03
Delirium on admission 3 (8.1) 3 (4.1) 0.37
History of nosocomial pneumonia 2 (5.4) 8 (10.8) 0.24
Comorbidities (any) 34 (91.9) 73 (98.7) 0.07
Chronic respiratory disease 6 (16.2) 25 (33.8) 0.04
Diabetes mellitus 6 (16.2) 21 (28.4) 0.16
Hypertension 25 (67.6) 52 (70.3) 0.77
Chronic cardiovascular disease 17 (46.0) 36 (48.7) 0.79
Chronic renal disease 7 (18.9) 14 (18.9) 1.00
Chronic liver disease 1 (2.7) 5 (6.8) 0.37
Chronic neurological impairment 12 (32.4) 16 (21.6) 0.22
Haematological disease with immunosuppression 0 6 (8.1) 0.08
Cancer 8 (21.6) 16 (21.6) 1.00
Rheumatological disease 0 5 (5.4) 0.15
Dementia 8 (21.6) 25 (33.8) 0.19
HIV positive 0 4 (5.4) 0.15
Immunosuppressive therapy 1 (2.7) 2 (2.7) 1.00
Treatment with ACE inhibitor 14 (37.8) 16 (21.6) 0.07
HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; ACE, angiotensin-converting enzyme.
Results are expressed as median and interquartile range, or count and percentage.
a Missing for two patients.
b Missing for five patients.
c Missing for 23 patients.
Table II
Characteristics of hospital employees
M. Abbas et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 117 (2021) 124e134128closing the wards on the second floor, the upper limit of the 95%
CrI was >1 (Supplementary Figure 2, see online supplementary
material). Pre-emptive contact precautions and mandatory
masking of patients outside of rooms decreased Rt further, with
the upper limit of the 95% CrI <1.Characteristic Hospital employees (N¼37)
Age, years 44 (38e52)
Female 33 (84.6)
Profession
Registered nurse 15 (38.5)
Nurse assistant 13 (33.3)
Doctor 4 (10.3)
Physical therapists 3 (7.7)
Administrative staff 2 (5.1)
Apprentice 2 (5.1)
Any symptomsa 33 (100%)
Time from symptom to swab, days 1 (1e3)
a Missing for four cases.Phylogenetic tree
SARS-CoV-2 sequences were obtained for 62 cases (31
patients, 31 employees), and a phylogenetic tree was gen-
erated (Figure 2). Interestingly, although some tree branches
should be interpreted with caution due to moderate bootstrap
values reflecting the very high sequence homology between
isolates, some branch-specific mutations (e.g. C5239T,
C15324T or G29781T) were observed that support some
branching order. Sixty of 62 sequences (96.8%) formed a large
single cluster with clear segregation from the community
sequences. One large subcluster (bootstrap 60%) was observed
which corresponds to a specific ward in the clinic. Sequences
from patients and HCWs were distributed similarly across allbranches of the tree. The phylogenetic analysis suggests
importation of two cases (3.2%): H2030 (HCW) and H2013
(admin).
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Figure 2. Phylogenetic tree of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) genome sequences. The tree includes 62
sequences related to the outbreak (patient and employee sequences are named C2xx and H20xx, respectively), alongside all the com-
munity cases in the canton of Geneva that were sequenced in MarcheApril 2020 and submitted to GISAID [virus names and accession ID
(i.e. EPI_ISL_) are indicated] in the context of an epidemiological surveillance. For each sequence, the date of the sample collection is
mentioned (yyyy-mm-dd).
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Figure 3 shows the main analysis (see Supplementary
Figure 3 for GelmaneRubin diagnostics, and Supplementary
Figures 4e6 for sensitivity analyses). The probabilistic
reconstruction of who infected whom demonstrates sub-
stantial uncertainty (Figure 3A), with only two and 12 ances-
tries (i.e. infectors) identified with 50% and 25% posterior
probability, respectively. The model assumes that the first
case in the outbreak is imported, and identified two addi-
tional imported cases. Both the ancestry plot (Figure 3A) and
the highest posterior transmission tree (Figure 3B) suggest
several super-spreading events, most likely originating from
HCWs. Of the two infected administrative staff, one was
detected as an imported case, and the other was estimated to
have been infected by a HCW with a posterior probability of
81.6%.
The proportion of infections attributed to HCWs (noted
fHCW) was compared with random expectations assuming
HCWs, and patients were equally likely to seed new infections.
fHCW was significantly higher than expected in all settings
considered (Figure 4, Supplementary Table 2, see online
supplementary material), with a relative excess of trans-
mission from HCWs ranging from 31% to 76% more infections
than expected. The proportion of transmission from HCWs was
larger when considering infection of patients (79.0%; 95% CI
78.5e79.5%), particularly frail patients (CFS score >5: 82.3%;
95% CI 81.8e83.4%).
The sensitivity analyses did not show major changes in
either the probabilities of transmission pairs or the overall
structure of the consensus transmission tree, with the excep-
tion of the model without any contact data, which, as expec-
ted, had worse resolution and suggested fewer transmission
events by HCWs (Supplementary Figures 4e7, see online
supplementary material). All sensitivity analyses similarly
showed that the infections from HCWs were more frequent
than usual (all P-values <2.2e-16), albeit with varying effect
sizes (Supplementary Figure 8, see online supplementary
material). Lowest effects were found when ignoring contact
data, with an overall fHCW of 54.9% (95% CI 54.5e55.3%), yet
significantly greater than the expected 46.8% (Wilcox-
oneManneWhitney test: V¼480614, P<2.2e-16).
Caseecontrol study
Characteristics of patients with nosocomial COVID-19 and
uninfected controls are shown in Table I. In the univariable
analysis, patients with nosocomial COVID-19 were significantly
older than uninfected controls [87 years (IQR 77e89) vs 80 (IQR
74e86)], were less likely to be active smokers (2.7% vs 16.2%),
and were more frail (CFS score>5: 89.2% vs 54.1%). There were
no significant differences between nosocomial cases and
uninfected controls in terms of obesity, delirium on admission,
or prevalence of comorbidities, except for a lower proportion
of cases with chronic respiratory disease among patients with
nosocomial COVID-19 (16.2% vs 33.8%).
Results of the univariable and multi-variable logistic
regression model for risk of acquisition of nosocomial COVID-19
are shown in Table III. In the multi-variable analysis, CFS score
>5 substantially increased the risk of nosocomial COVID-19
(adjusted OR 6.94; 95% CI 2.13e22.57).Discussion
This study describes an explosive nosocomial outbreak of
SARS-CoV-2 in a rehabilitation clinic involving both patients and
HCWs. Despite rich data and sequencing availability, including
HCWs, and even using advanced epidemiological and genomic
analyses, the authors were unable to reconstruct who infected
whom in the outbreak with high confidence. However, it was
shown that HCWs played an undisputable role in introducing
SARS-CoV-2 into the facility, and were the main drivers of
infection to patients and each other.
It has been conventional wisdom, particularly during the
first pandemic wave, that patients posed a greater risk to HCWs
than vice versa, even with appropriate personal protective
equipment. This has also been suggested by a recent outbreak
investigation in an acute care hospital [28]. Although the
authors do not dispute the fact that appropriate IPC measures
are essential to protect HCWs, these results suggest that
patients are more likely to become infected by HCWs than vice
versa in non-COVID settings. HCWs did not only introduce SARS-
CoV-2 in the clinic, but were also at the origin of most super-
spreading events. Conversely, direct patient-to-patient trans-
mission in a setting such as a rehabilitation clinic or LTCF does
not appear to be a major driver of infection.
These results suggest that in such closed settings, with a
dense outbreak and a relatively slowly evolving pathogen,
genomic sequencing data offer little added value. Indeed, in
this outbreak, the large majority of isolates formed a single
large cluster. Nevertheless, genomic surveillance can still be
useful, for example for the detection of novel variants of dis-
ease, and to understand epidemic and evolutionary patterns at
larger geographical and temporal scales [29,30].
Although this outbreak occurred in a setting with high
adherence to traditional IPC measures, the authors managed to
control the outbreak successfully with non-pharmaceutical
interventions without availability of real-time genomic data.
Indeed, Rt decreased to <1 after closing the ward with the
highest number of infections. The authors are confident that
the IPC measures were responsible for the control of the out-
break, and not depletion of susceptibles. Indeed, given the
peak estimated Rt values, an attack rate ranging between 83%
and 96% would have been expected in the absence of IPC
measures, which is far greater than what was observed.
The findings from this study confirm previous concerns that
HCWs play a major role in initiating, amplifying and sustaining
outbreaks of nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 [6]. In this outbreak,
approximately 80% of patient infection events were attribut-
able to HCWs. Furthermore, HCWs can infect their peers in the
work environment, but outside of direct clinical contact in
places such as the cafeteria, break rooms or offices. Physical
distancing guidelines can sometimes be difficult to adhere to
due to architectural constraints (e.g. small offices). Practices
such as car-sharing or couch-surfing due to border restrictions
may also have played a role.
This study identified patient frailty as an important inde-
pendent risk factor for nosocomial acquisition of SARS-CoV-2,
which has been suggested by previous reports [31]. This can
stem from biological phenomena whereby there is increased
susceptibility to acquiring an infection (e.g. due to immuno-
senescence), or from differences in contact patterns because



































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Selected output of the outbreaker2 model. (A) Ancestry reconstruction. (B) Transmission tree from Markov-Chain Monte-
Carlo iteration with highest likelihood. Patients and employees are named C2xx and H20xx, respectively. HCW, healthcare worker.
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COVID-19, however, has been associated with poorer out-
comes in geriatric patients [31,32], and this may be due to
underlying biological reasons. For this reason, it is paramount
that SARS-CoV-2 be kept outside the walls of LTCFs and nursing
homes [33].
This study has several strengths, including the fact it was a
comprehensive outbreak investigation which captured a high
proportion of cases due to the aggressive testing strategy early
in the first pandemic wave. Widespread testing of patients and
HCWs, especially asymptomatic, is now conventional wisdom,
but at the time represented a veritable paradigm shift in the
management of respiratory viral nosocomial outbreaks during
the early phase of the pandemic. Another strength of this study
is that epidemiological and genomic data on HCWs who were
























































Figure 4. Proportions of transmissions attributed to healthcare wor
binomial distributions of fHCW given the proportion of HCWs amongst c
transmission trees reconstructed by outbreaker2. Dotted lines in
Transmission to HCWs alone. (C) Transmission to patients alone. (D) Tinvestigations have few data or genomic sequences of HCWs
[6], yet the present study demonstrated that their role is
essential. The data collected in this study are of high quality as
they were mostly collected prospectively. Also, the authors
were able to obtain genomic sequences of SARS-CoV-2 for most
(>80%) cases, which increases the robustness of the approach.
Finally, the authors used sophisticated modelling techniques,
which combined epidemiological and genetic sequencing data
in order to reconstruct the outbreak and to provide insight into
transmission patterns.
Nevertheless, several limitations should be considered when
interpreting the results. First, the estimates of serial interval
and incubation periods that were selected can be challenged;
however, the results were not sensitive to a longer serial
interval, associated with less timely control of the outbreak.





kers (HCWs) (fHCW). The blue histograms indicate the expected
ases. The red histograms show the distribution of fHCW across 999
dicate the mean estimate of the proportion. (A) All cases. (B)
ransmission to frail patients alone.
Table III
Univariable and multi-variable logistic regression analysis for risk of nosocomial acquisition of coronavirus disease 2019 among patients
Characteristic Unadjusted OR (95% CI) P-value Adjusted OR (95% CI) P-value
Age, years 1.06 (1.01e1.11) 0.02
Age (>80 years) 1.73 (0.77e3.88) 0.18 1.03 (0.42e2.52) 0.95
Gender (female) 1.55 (0.65e3.69) 0.32
Obesity 0.48 (0.15e1.56) 0.22
Active smoking 0.14 (0.02e1.15) 0.07
Low serum albumin 1.63 (0.74e3.61) 0.23
Low serum pre-albumin 2.32 (0.95e5.66) 0.06
Clinical Frailty Scale score >5 7.01 (2.26e21.79) 0.001 6.94 (2.13e22.57) 0.001
Cumulative Illness Rating Scale e Geriatric >14 0.90 (0.41e1.98) 0.79
Charlson Comorbidity Index >7 2.46 (1.07e5.65) 0.03
Delirium on admission 2.09 (0.40e10.89) 0.38
History of nosocomial pneumonia 0.49 (0.10e2.41) 0.38
Comorbidities (any) 0.16 (0.02e1.55) 0.11
Chronic respiratory disease 0.41 (0.15e1.12) 0.08
Diabetes mellitus 0.49 (0.18e1.34) 0.16
Hypertension 0.88 (0.38e2.06) 0.77
Chronic cardiovascular disease 0.90 (0.41e1.98) 0.79
Chronic renal disease 1.00 (0.37e2.74) 1.00
Chronic liver disease 0.38 (0.04e3.41) 0.39
Chronic neurological impairment 1.74 (0.72e4.21) 0.22
Cancer 1.00 (0.38e2.61) 1.00
Dementia 0.54 (0.22e1.36) 0.19
Immunosuppressive therapy 1.00 (0.09e11.40) 1.00
Treatment with ACE inhibitor 2.21 (0.93e5.24) 0.07
ACE, angiotensin-converting enzyme; OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.
M. Abbas et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 117 (2021) 124e134 133model due to lack of genomic sequences (14 of 76 cases);
nonetheless, the model is designed and has been proven able to
identify unsampled cases in the transmission chains [27].
In conclusion, this study showed that nosocomial outbreaks
of SARS-CoV-2 in rehabilitation clinics can spread very quickly
in a population with a naı̈ve immune system, and that both
introduction and spread of disease can be mediated by HCWs.
This has long-term implications for IPC in settings with older
and frail populations who are at increased risk of acquiring
respiratory viral infections, including SARS-CoV-2. This study
also demonstrated an example of a situation where genomic
data, even when augmented with rich epidemiological data,
have little added value for outbreak control.
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